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The State responds as follows to the arguments raised in Defendant's brief. 
Reply to Point LA 
DEFENDANT MISSTATES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
BINDOVER STANDARD 
Defendant asserts that a magistrate's probable c^use determination at 
preliminary hearing, while reviewed for correctness, is afforded "great discretion." 
Br. Aple. 2 (quoting State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 14, 48 PJ3d 872). Defendant is 
mistaken regarding the discretion to be afforded a magistrate's bindover decision. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held, a magistrates discretion in making 
a bindover determination is not great, but "limited/' State p., Virgin, 2006 UT 29, |T[ 
23-24, 31-34,137 P.3d 787. A magistrate's "discretion is limited . . . because in the 
bindover context a magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is 
limited." Id. at 1f 34. 
Defendant's mistake comes from his reliance on Norris. While Norris dealt 
with a magistrate's probable cause determination, it did so not in the context of a 
preliminary hearing, but in the context of a search warrant. See Norris, 2001 UT 104, 
Tf 14. In the search warrant or suppression context, unlike the bindover context, a 
magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is not limited. See State v. 
Hurt, 2010 UT App 33, If 15, 227 P.3d 271 (in suppression context, because '"a 
district court is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh 
the evidence, the court of appeals may not substitute its judgment as to a factual 
question unless the district court's finding is clearly erroneous'") (citation omitted). 
Thus, a magistrate's probable cause determination for a search warrant is 
necessarily afforded more discretion than in the bindover context. See Virgin, 2006 
UT 29, | 34. 
Defendant also erroneously states that "the magistrate was free to draw his 
own inferences from [the facts], and not necessarily in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution." Br. Aple. 4 n.3. But, as explained in the State's opening brief, it is 
well-settled that a magistrate "must view all evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, If 10, 20 P.3d 300 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, when there are competing reasonable inferences, the magistrate is 
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obligated to choose those inferences that support the prosecution's case. See id. at f^ 
20. Thus, contrary to Defendant's claim, the magistrate was "necessarily" required 
not only to view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, but 
also to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. 
Defendant also suggests that a magistrate is "within his or her discretion to 
make credibility determinations in regard to the evidence, and may discount or 
disregard evidence that does not support a reasonable belief as to an element of the 
charges." Br. Aple. 6 (citing State v. Ingram, 2006 UT App 237, f 19,139 P.3d 286). 
Defendant overstates the discretion afforded magistrates to make credibility 
determinations at a preliminary hearing. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, 
a magistrate's "evaluation of credibility at a preliminary hearing is limited to 
determining that 'evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference 
to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim.'" Virgin, 2006 UT 29, 
If 24 (quoting State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)) (alteration in original). 
"It is inappropriate for a magistrate to weigh credible but conflicting evidence at 
preliminary hearing as a preliminary hearing 'is not a trial on the merits' but 'a 
gateway to the finder of fact.'" Id. (quoting Talbot, 972 f.ld at 438). Rather, 
"magistrates must leave all the weighing of credible but conflicting evidence to the 
trier of fact and must 'view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
3 
prosecution[,] resolv[ing] all inferences in favor of the prosecution/" Id. (citation 
omitted) (alterations in Virgin). 
Reply to Point LB. 
THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
THE PROSECUTION AND DRAWING ALL REASONABLE 
INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION, SUPPORTS A 
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED THE 
CONTRABAND 
Defendant essentially argues that the preliminary hearing evidence did not 
support a reasonable inference that he "constructively possessed" the contraband, 
because it did not show that he had "exclusive control" of his motel room. Br. Aple. 
8. Defendant's argument, however, like the magistrate's ruling below, fails to view 
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and to draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. 
Defendant asserts that the State's only evidence supporting a nexus between 
him and the contraband was that Defendant "had rented that motel room at some 
point," but that there was no evidence "of when he rented that room, how long he 
rented it for, who he rented it with, etc." Br. Aple. 9. Defendant further asserts that 
an officer on cross-examination "conceded" that the room was not under the 
"exclusive control of" Defendant. Id. at 8. Defendant reasons that since Defendant 
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" was not the only person with access to the motel room," the State did not show that 
the contraband belonged to him. Id. at 8-9. 
Defendant's argument ignores much of the State's evidence and the 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. First, contrary to Defendant's 
claim, the only evidence regarding occupancy of the room was that Defendant lived 
there alone. Defendant told officers he lived at the motel and gave them his room 
number. See R41:12-13. Defendant invited the officers to search his room. R41:12-
13,15. By so doing, Defendant showed that he himself believed that the room was 
his and that he continued to exercise authority and control over it. His conduct also 
shows that he believed that the officers would find his room as he left it—with the 
clean pipe in his bed, under some covers. R41:13. Officers also found paperwork 
and a prescription bottle bearing Defendant's name. R41:20, 23. Officers found 
nothing in the room identified as belonging to someone else. R41:23. Taken 
together, this evidence leads to the reasonable inference that Defendant alone 
occupied the room. 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that "numerous people, including individuals 
not associated with the motel, had ready access to the motel room." Br. Aple. 9. The 
record does not bear out this claim. An officer did concede that the manager, who 
had let police into the room, would have had prior access to the room; and the 
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officer "imagined" that the housekeeping staff also would have had access to the 
room. R41:22-23. But no evidence suggested that "numerous" people or that 
anyone not associated with the motel had access to the room without Defendant's 
knowledge or permission. Indeed, the record citation Defendant relies on to make 
this claim merely states that before talking to police, Defendant had asked a friend 
of his to go to the room to find the pipe. Br. Aple. 9 (citing R41:6). 
But the fact that others might have had access to Defendant's room does not 
undercut the reasonable inference from the totality of the evidence that Defendant 
was the person with the strongest factual nexus to the contraband: he lived alone in 
the room where it was found, R41:12-13, 20-23; he continued to exercise authority 
and control over the room by inviting police to search it, R41:12-13,15; he admitted 
to having a drug problem, R41:16; he admitted to possessing other paraphernalia—a 
clean pipe and a syringe—commonly used for ingesting illegal drugs, R41:16; police 
found the pipe, undisturbed in Defendant's bed, where Defendant said it would be, 
R41:13; and the contraband was found discarded in a garbage sack, R41:14,16-20. 
Indeed, Defendant's and the magistrate's speculation that someone else might 
have accessed the room and planted the contraband in Defendant's garbage sack is 
unreasonable under the totality of the evidence. As explained in the State's opening 
brief, nothing in the evidence suggests a reason why someone other than Defendant 
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would have taken the trouble to place the contraband in a garbage sack in a room 
occupied solely by Defendant. And, presumably, if housekeeping had accessed the 
room, the garbage sack would have been removed. 
Defendant asserts that because he told police that he "iftjected drugs and did 
not smoke them," his admissions cannot support "an inferente that [he] possessed 
drugs and paraphernalia designed to be smoked, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution/' Br. Aple. 9-10. Defendant's charges, however, were 
based on methamphetamine residue in the baggie and on the tube straw, not on the 
clean pipe. R36-37; R41:38-39. Thus, nothing in the evidence suggests that the 
methamphetamine was designed to be smoked as opposed to being injected. But, 
more importantly, the evidence must be viewed in the light imost favorable to the 
prosecution in its entirety. As explained in the State's opening brief, in a 
constructive possession case, the required nexus may be established by means of 
several different factors, including, where appropriate "previbus drug use/7 State v. 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, | 32, 122 P.3d 639. Thus, Defendant's incriminating 
admissions—including his drug abuse—together with the discovery of the 
contraband in a garbage sack in his living quarters, give rise to a reasonable belief 
that the contraband belonged to Defendant. 
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In short, even assuming that Defendant's and the magistrate's competing 
inferences were reasonable, the magistrate was obligated to accept the inferences 
that supported the prosecution's case and allow the case to go to a jury. See Clark, 
2001 UT 9, | 20. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the dismissal of the charges and remand for the 
magistrate to bind Defendant over to stand trial on the two charges. 
Respectfully submitted August ^252010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JRA B. DUPAIX 
'"Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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